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ABSTRACT: This article examines the silence of the EU Treaties on the implementation
and functions of general international law in the European Union legal order. Given the EU’s
growing activity on the international plane which is subject to the rules of international law,
it is remarkable that neither the Treaty drafters nor any subsequent Treaty amendments
included an ‘incorporation clause’ in primary Union law that would clarify the legal status and
rank of general international law within the EU. Regarding the functions of general
international law, this article explores whether this silence has an impact on subsequent
Member State practice in contravention of the Treaties, and the autonomous status of EU
law, which provides for a comprehensive procedural ‘toolbox’ in order to redress
infringements, and thus excludes the fall-back to countermeasures under international law
between the Member States and the Union and between the Member States inter se. This
article eventually concludes that the inclusion of an incorporation clause may have prevented
the Court of Justice of the European Union from following a flexible approach towards
international law, whilst the silence of the Treaties with respect to the functions of
international rules remains irrelevant for the autonomy of EU law.
KEYWORDS: European Union law, general international law, reception and
implementation of international law, monism and dualism, subsequent State practice, self-
contained regimes, relationship between EU law and general international law
I. Introduction
International legal norms may influence domestic legal orders in very different
ways. Especially general international law1 is of fundamental importance for the
functioning of the international legal system. Due to its ‘omnipresence’ and its
( Lecturer, Department of Law; Queen Mary, University of London. I would like to thank the
reviewers and Violeta Moreno-Lax for their insightful observations on a previous draft.
1 In the context of this contribution, general international law refers to all international norms that
are not ‘treaty law,’ especially customary international law and general principles of law.
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seminal character in forming the background of the international legal order,2 general
international law and, in particular, its most basic rules, such as the prohibition of the
use of force and State responsibility, have been assigned a substantial ‘constitutional
quality’ within different municipal legal orders.3 The implementation and functions
of general international law within the EU’s legal system are nevertheless not entirely
clear and remain somewhat obscure.
With respect to the question of implementation, attentive readers of the Union
Treaties4 might have noticed that these very Treaties remain entirely silent on this
matter,5 given that there is no provision comparable to Article 216 (2) Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), governing the legal effects of
international treaties for the Union, on general international law. Unlike many
constitutions of the Member States,6 the Treaties lack an ‘incorporation clause’ which
typically forms an integral part of the domestic legal orders of sovereign nation-States7
and governs the implementation of international law within domestic law, and thus
leave the further shaping of rules concerning the adoption and reception of general
2 International Law Commission (ILC), Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law: Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006),
para. 122.
3 Robert Uerpmann-Wittzack, Völkerrechtliche Verfassungselemente, in: Armin von
Bogdandy/Jürgen Bast (eds.), Europäisches Verfassungsrecht: Theoretische und dogmatische
Grundzüge (2nd ed. 2009), 177, 178.
4 Treaty on European Union, 9 May 2008, OJ 2008 C 115, 13 (consolidated version) (TEU);
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 26 October 2012, OJ 2012 C 326, 47 (consolidated
version 2012) (TFEU).
5 Alessandra Gianelli, Customary International Law in the European Union, in: Enzo
Cannizzaro/Paolo Palchetti/Ramses A. Wessel (eds.), International Law as Law of the European Union
(2012), 93, 93.
6 Cf., e.g., Art. 25 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland), BGBl. 1949, 1, as amended on 11 July 2012, BGBl. I, 1478; Art. 9 (1)
Austrian Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), StGBl. Nr. 450, BGBl. Nr. 1; Art. 10 (1) Italian
Constitution (Costituzione della Repubblica Italiana), Gazzetta Ufficiale n. 298 of 27 December 1947;
Art. 2 (2) Constitution of the Hellenic Republic (Σύνταγμα της Eλλάδας), Official Gazette of the
Hellenic Republic A'120 of 27 June 2008.
7 Kirsten Schmalenbach, Die Europäische Union und das universelle Völkerrecht, in: Werner
Schroeder (ed.), Europarecht als Mehrebenensystem: Beiträge zum 7. Österreichischen Europarechtstag
2007 (2008), 67, 67–68; Pieter Jan Kuijper, “It Shall Contribute to … the Strict Observance and
Development of International Law …”: The Role of the Court of Justice, in: Allan Rosas/Egils
Levits/Yves Bot (eds.), The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives
on Sixty Years of Case-Law (2013), 589, 589–590.
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international law and decisions of international organisations to the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) and its judges in Luxembourg.8 Even though the
European Parliament in 1997 called for a clear statement on the relationship between
public international law and EU law to be written into the Treaties,9 this call went
utterly unheeded. The question remains, however, whether this silence represents a
legal problem that has to be dealt with, or whether this silence allows the CJEU a
more flexible approach towards the reception and implementation of international
norms. Part II of this contribution will therefore determine the status within EU law
of general international norms which bind the EU vis-à-vis the outside world, and
what effort the EU legal order makes to ensure that the Union’s international legal
obligations are faithfully adhered to in the light of the absence of such a provision.
In contrast to the implementation of general international law within Union law,
the question of the former’s function within the latter is a completely different one.
Seeing that the Treaties also remain silent on this matter, one might ask if and to
what extent the norms of general international law can be drawn upon, either directly
or by analogy, to fill any gaps which EU law leaves with regard to the relations
between the EU and its Member States as well as between those Member States inter
se within the scope of application of the Treaties. While most constitutions of federal
States proclaim to exhaustively regulate intra-federal legal relations,10 leaving no room
for the application of general international law (except where the federal constitution
permits it)11, the quasi-federal legal order of the EU is different, as it simply does not
8 Pieter Jan Kuijper, Customary International Law, Decisions of International Organisations and
other Techniques for Ensuring Respect for International Legal Rules in European Community Law, in:
Jan Wouters/André Nollkaemper/Erika de Wet (eds.), The Europeanisation of International Law: The
Status of International Law in the EU and its Member States (2008), 87, 87.
9 European Parliament, Resolution on the relationships between international law, Community law
and the constitutional law of the Member States, 27 October 1997, OJ 1997 C 325, 26, para. 14.
10 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), BVerfGE 1, 14, 133; BVerfGE 34,
216, 53; Stefan Talmon, Die Grenzen der Anwendung des Völkerrechts im deutschen Recht,
JuristenZeitung 68 (2013), 12, 16.
11 Cf. Art. III sec. 2 Constitution of the United States of America, giving the US Supreme Court
jurisdiction over interstate disputes, which applied customary international rules to resolve border
disputes (e.g. US Supreme Court, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657 (1838)), or disputes
regarding water rights (e.g. US Supreme Court, Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902)) between two
states. Cf. also Art. 15a (3) Austrian Constitution, stating that the principles of the international law of
treaties are applicable to arrangements between the federation and the states (e.g. Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshof), VfGH A13/96, VfSlg 15.309).
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exhaustively regulate the relations between the Member States. Consequently, certain
Member States which might have an interest in resolving legal disputes with either
other Member States or the Union itself not on the basis of EU but general
international law could take advantage of this gap to the detriment of EU law.
Recourse to countermeasures and the instruments provided for by general
international law in order to respond to violations of international obligations could
undermine the more sophisticated dispute settlement mechanisms enshrined in the
EU Treaties. For instance, even though Article 7 Treaty on European Union (TEU)
has been introduced into the Treaties to respond to serious breaches of fundamental
Union values after the so-called ‘EU-XIV Sanctions’ had been imposed against
Austria in the year 2000, this latter example could encourage the Member States to
circumvent EU law and to rely on general international law to settle their disputes.
Especially the Kadi saga is living proof that, for example, the United Kingdom – for
the obvious reason of efficiently combating international terrorism – would rather see
international law prevail over European Union law at the end of the day in particular
instances.12 Part IV therefore examines whether recourse to the rules of general
international law besides the EU’s own dispute settlement mechanisms is permissible
and whether such a step constitutes in fact a practical and viable option for the
Member States.
Part V eventually summarises the findings of this contribution and draws
conclusions on what the silence of the Treaties on both the implementation and the
function of general international law within the EU legal order means for the latter’s
proper functioning.
II. The External Perspective: The Question of Implementation
A. Strict Observance or Indifference?
The silence of the Treaties on the way general international law may or may not be
received within the EU’s legal order is not a mere hypothetical problem since the
Union interacts with the outside world and therefore has to abide by the rules of the
12 Court of First Instance (CFI), Case T-315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council and Commission,
2005 ECR II-3649, para. 217.
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international community. At the outset, it is of course obvious that the Union was
indisputably conceived as an international organisation, which did not require a
comprehensive and clear provision on its relationship with the ‘rest’ of international
law. As an – admittedly autonomous – subsystem of the international legal order, the
EU system hence remains part of the ‘primeval soup’ of general international law (lex
generalis) and constitutes a closed and specialised legal order within the universal
system (lex specialis).13 However, as the distance from the ‘maternal’ international
legal order grew and the European Union became more ‘domestic’ in nature, a
specification on the role of general international law within Union law may have been
useful.
The Lisbon Treaty14 eventually introduced two noteworthy references to general
international law in the Treaties, namely Articles 3 (5) and 21 TEU which set a
pivotal agenda for the EU’s relationship with international law and the wider world.15
These provisions flesh out the Union’s commitment to comply with and respect
general international law, and therefore to not ignore the international legal order as
‘the law of the others.’16 Yet, these provisions nevertheless fail to answer the question
how general international law is to be implemented within European Union law,
which prevents us from considering these provisions as ‘incorporation clauses.’ One
could presume that the absence of such a provision may mirror the Treaty framers’
indifference toward international law. There is per se nothing wrong with such
indifference or even a dualist stance towards international law, but the downplaying
of the relevance and applicability of international law could indeed be a cause for
concern.17 One may thus ask why this is so and whether that failure in codification
could lie in the idiosyncratic position which general international law holds within
Union law.18 But maybe there is more to that plain reason than meets the eye:
13 Schmalenbach (note 7), 74.
14 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, 13 December 2007, OJ 2007 C 306, 01.
15 Piet Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (2011), 96.
16 Schmalenbach (note 7), 68.
17 Jan Klabbers, Völkerrechtsfreundlich? International Law and the Union Legal Order, in: Panos
Koutrakos (ed.), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives (2011), 95, 97.
18 Gianelli (note 5), 95.
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Perhaps the Treaty drafters thought that ‘loose lips might sink ships’19 and therefore
had sensible reasons to omit any explicit reference to the status of general
international law within the EU legal order. The subsequent section will try to
provide an answer to these questions.
B. From Initial Openness to Practical Flexibility
As Aristotle said quite rightly, it is obvious that it is inconceivable for anybody to
live outside society or to have no need of it because of self-sufficiency.20 The same is
true of the European Union and its embedment into the international legal order.
Lacking a provision which would somehow govern the EU’s relationship with general
international law and the latter’s implementation in the former, the CJEU necessarily
had to fill these gaps through its jurisprudence in order to be able to interact with the
‘outside world.’ In this vein, the provision on the reception of general international
law within Union law, parallel to that of treaty norms (Article 216 (2) TFEU), can
now be found in the continuously developing case law of the Luxembourg Court.
The Court’s early case law was informed by openness and respect, and – especially
in cases relating to the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the territoriality
principle21 – it applied customary international law almost as a matter of course.22
The CJEU subsequently recognised the binding force of international law as a source
of EU law, for instance, when faced with questions of interpreting treaties or
19 This phrase was used on United States propaganda posters during World War II to deter people
from careless talk in public about ship movements.
20 Aristotle, Politics, Book I, chapter 2.
21 Cf., e.g., European Court of Justice (ECJ), Case 48/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. v.
Commission, 1972 ECR 619; ECJ, Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85, 125/85,
126/58, 127/85, 128/85, 129/85, A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Commission, 1988 ECR 5193;
CFI, Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd. v. Commission, 1999 ECR II-753.
22 Kuijper (note 8), 595.
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international decisions;23 in particular in specific areas such as the law of the sea;24 and
in determining the precise meaning of international legal notions referred to by
Union law, inter alia, State responsibility25 and the immunity of international
organisations.26 The most explicit expression toward the binding force and
implementation of general international law, however, can be found in the seminal
Racke case where the Luxembourg Court ruled that the EU must not only respect
international law in the exercise of its powers in principle, but that the rules of
customary international law are binding upon the Union institutions and form part
of the EU legal order. Consequently, every piece of EU secondary legislation is also
required to be in compliance with customary international law.27 This quite
progressive position28 in Racke was then complemented by the decision in Opel
Austria through which the customary principle of protection of legitimate
expectations, as codified in Article 18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT),29 was basically transformed into a general principle of EU law.30 Until this
point, the Court’s case law appears to be based on the notion that general
23 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-432/92, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte S.
P. Anastasiou (Pissouri) Ltd. and Others, 1994 ECR I-3087, para. 43; ECJ, Case C-308/06, The Queen,
on the application of International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v.
Secretary of State for Transport, 2008 ECR I-4057, paras. 54–66; ECJ, Case C-386/08, Firma Brita
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Hafen, 2010 ECR I-1289, para. 41.
24 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v. Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation
Corp, 1992 ECR I-6019, paras. 9–10; ECJ, Case C-405/92, Etablissements Armand Mondiet SA v.
Armement Islais SARL, 1993 ECR I-6133, paras. 13–14; ECJ, Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v.
Universal Ogden Services Ltd., 2002 ECR I-2013, para. 34.
25 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-63/09, Axel Walz v. Clickair SA, 2010 ECR I-4239, paras. 27–28.
26 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-113/07, SELEX Sistemi Integrati SpA v. Commission and Organisation
européenne pour la sécurité de la navigation aérienne (Eurocontrol), 2009 ECR I-2207, para. 110 (opinion
of AG Trstenjak).
27 ECJ, Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 ECR I-3655, paras.
45–46.
28 Jan Wouters/Dries van Eeckhoutte, Giving Effect to Customary International Law through
European Community Law, in: Jolande M. Prinssen/Annette Schrauwen (eds.), Direct Effect:
Rethinking a Classic of EC Legal Doctrine (2002), 183, 202 and 210.
29 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 13 May 1969, UNTS 1155, 331 (VCLT).
30 CFI, Case T-115/94, Opel Austria GmbH v. Council, 1998 ECR II-2739, para. 93.
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international law is directly applicable within EU law – in accordance with a more or
less monist approach.31
The European Union’s current practice in the area of general international law,
however, could – colloquially speaking – be considered schizophrenic, as the
seemingly functioning relationship between Union law and general international law
appears to have come to an end in the Kadi cases,32 which are usually considered the
‘dualist’ breaking-point in a hitherto ‘monist’ liaison.33 One might ask whether a
classical ‘incorporation clause’ on general international law could have prevented the
CJEU from following the flexible approach it applied in the Kadi cases and thus from
protecting fundamental rights – albeit at the price of a consistent approach towards
international law. In Kadi I, the CJEU in fact goes great lengths to highlight that the
“bridges”34 between the international legal order and the EU remain intact. The
Court accepts the primacy of Security Council resolutions in international law and
emphasises that the EU’s obligations under international law remain valid as it
certainly is bound by international norms35 – unless, of course, these international
obligations fall foul of the Union’s own rights standards, prompting the CJEU to put
up a ‘wall’ and thus to perform a normative closure vis-à-vis international law.36
But the Court’s refusal to give full effect to international law in the Kadi cases is
nevertheless not arbitrary or whimsical; on the contrary, it is required by the principle
of the rule of law and to be welcomed as a substantive entitlement of fundamental
31 Allan Rosas, The European Court of Justice and Public International Law, in:
Wouters/Nollkaemper/de Wet (eds.) (note 8), 71, 80.
32 ECJ, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v. Council and Commission, 2008 ECR I-6351 (Kadi I); ECJ, Joined Cases C-
584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P, Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi (Kadi II),
available via: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-584/10&language=de (accessed on 3 March
2015).
33 Cf., e.g., Gráinne de Búrca, The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order after
Kadi, Harvard International Law Journal 51 (2010), 1, 44 et seq.
34 Achilles Skordas, Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit as Comity and the Disquiet of Neoformalism: A
Response to Jan Klabbers, in: Koutrakos (ed.) (note 17), 115, 139.
35 ECJ, Kadi I (note 32), paras. 290–297.
36 Skordas (note 34), 137–138.
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rights.37 By declaring that the listing and de-listing procedure of persons being
suspected of terrorist activities on the UN level does not live up to the level of
fundamental rights protection as guaranteed by judicial review,38 the CJEU’s final
judgment in Kadi II could be seen as an EU countermeasure against the apparently
illegal (yet valid) Security Council measure in question.39 One may therefore
speculate that if an ‘incorporation clause’ had existed at the time Kadi was decided,
the CJEU might have been misled to blindly take into account international law as it
stood back then in the shape of the Security Council’s resolutions and, paradoxically,
to thereby violate international law at the same time, namely international human
rights.
C. A Monist Reinterpretation in Place of an Incorporation Clause
In the light of the foregoing findings, one could consequently argue that it was
exactly the continuing failure to include a norm parallel in wording and content to
Article 216 (2) TFEU on the implementation of general international law into the
Treaties that enabled the Court to decide the Kadi cases in the way it did: One can
speculate that even though the existence of an explicit incorporation clause would be
welcome from the viewpoint of legal theory and consistency (as this would have
allowed for an obvious and continuing open approach in the CJEU’s case law), it was
the very absence of such a provision which granted the Court the flexibility required
to guarantee the protection of fundamental rights. This would mean that, in practice,
the silence of the Treaties on the implementation of general international law makes
an enormous difference with regard to the outcome of concrete cases.
This is all the more confirmed by the Court’s settled case law in which it does in
fact comply with general international law despite the absence of an incorporation
clause. In Kadi II, for example, the CJEU holds that “the competent European Union
authority must take due account of the terms and objectives of the resolution
37 N. Türküler Isiksel, Fundamental Rights in the EU after Kadi and Al Barakaat, European Law
Journal 16 (2010), 551, 568.
38 ECJ, Kadi II (note 32), paras. 133–134.
39 Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council: Countermeasures against Wrongful
Sanctions (2011), 174–177.
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concerned and of the relevant obligations under that Charter [Charter of the United
Nations] relating to such implementation”40 – notwithstanding the notable
requirement under Article 47 Charter of Fundamental Rights41 that the EU
judicature verify the allegations underlying the reasons provided by the Security
Council.42 By acknowledging the importance of international peace and security yet
requiring human rights standards to be safeguarded in its pursuit, the Court not only
sidestepped the logically fallacious confrontation of security versus human rights,43
but also succeeded in implementing general international law, namely basic human
rights norms, without relying on an incorporation clause.44 The CJEU has thus
shown that taking international law seriously is not tantamount to an unqualified
deference to a seriously flawed regime.45 In fact, the Kadi saga did not undermine the
UN system in particular and international law in general, but strengthened their
transparency46 and legitimacy, and thus the unity of domestic and international law
in a sense which is comparable to that of Kelsenian theory.47 This means that not only
is an incorporation clause unnecessary for the EU’s compliance with international
40 ECJ, Kadi II (note 32), para. 106.
41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 2000, OJ 2000 364, 1 (EU
Charter).
42 ECJ, Kadi II (note 32), para. 119.
43 Arman Sarvarian, The Kadi II Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union:
Implications for Judicial Review of UN Security Council Resolutions, in: Matej Avbelj/Filippo
Fontanelli/Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Trial (2014),
95, 101.
44 One might counter this argument by stating that all the Court did was enforcing Art. 47 EU
Charter, which is – after all – a norm of EU law. However, the right to an effective remedy and a fair
trial as enshrined in this provision is well established in and thus inspired by global and regional human
rights law; e.g., Art. 14 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, UNTS
999, 171, and Arts. 6 and 13 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS No. 005. Cf. Dinah Shelton, Sources of Article 47
Rights, in: Steve Peers et al. (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (2014),
1200, 1200–1209.
45 Mattias Kumm, Rethinking Constitutional Authority: On the Structure and Limits of
Constitutional Pluralism, in: Matej Avbelj/Jan Komárek (eds.), Constitutional Pluralism in the
European Union and Beyond (2012), 39, 62–63.
46 Eileen Denza, Placing the European Union in International Context: Legitimacy of the Case Law,
in: Maurice Adams et al. (eds.), Judging Europe’s Judges (2013), 175, 186–187.
47 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (1952), 424–428.
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law, but also that the Court’s case law, despite the inexistence of such a clause, can be
interpreted in a rather monist and international law-friendly way.
Furthermore, a provision which explicitly designated the role of general
international law in the ‘constitutional’ basis of the European Union and thus
labelled its legal order as either ‘monist’ or ‘dualist’ could not exhaustively refer to all
the different functions general international law has (for example, as an interpretative
instrument or a potential yardstick for the invalidity of EU law). In other words, the
diversity of roles international law can have would not allow for a single and satisfying
provision in the EU Treaties. “Plurality by necessity,” as Gianelli puts it, therefore
seems to describe the intricate relationship between general international law and the
EU system in the best manner.48
Yet, even though Article 3 (5) TEU does not define the precise legal status of
general international law within the Union’s hierarchy of norms,49 its specific
wording may imply that international norms are incorporated into the EU’s legal
order as such, and not as ‘international law of the European Union’ – in other words,
it remains international law and continues to be a source of law of its own besides
‘genuine’ EU law.50 In the long run, the formula used in Article 3 (5) TEU will prove
useful short of being a proper incorporation clause, as it simply mentions the Union’s
obligations “[i]n its relations with the wider world,”51 and reminds the Court of the
EU’s obligations under general international law, as identified in Racke.52
III. The Internal Perspective: The Question of Function
A. The Various Functions of General International Law within EU Law
48 Gianelli (note 5), 97–98.
49 Wouters/van Eeckhoutte (note 28), 186.
50 Astrid Epiney, Die Bindung der Europäischen Union an das allgemeine Völkerrecht, Europarecht-
Beiheft 2 (2012), 25, 31.
51 Gianelli (note 5), 98.
52 ECJ, Kadi II (note 32), para. 103, and ECJ, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America
and Others v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 ECR I-13755, para. 101.
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In contrast to the question of whether and how general international law is being
received and implemented within the European Union legal order, this chapter
enquires whether general international law can be used in a very particular function
because of the absence of a provision on the EU-internal role of international law. At
the outset, it should therefore be underlined that the existence (or the non-existence)
of an implementation clause may well influence the role and functions of general
international law within a given domestic legal order, but that such influence between
an implementation clause and the domestic functions of international law need not
necessarily exist. The example of the Federal Republic of Germany demonstrates that
such a nexus between implementation and function should not be presumed lightly:
Although Article 25 German Constitution (Grundgesetz) proclaims in a monistic
way that “[t]he general rules of international law shall be an integral part of federal
law,” and thus binds Germany vis-à-vis the outside world, this does not permit
conclusions as to the applicability of general international law within the intra-federal
relations between the German Länder or between them and the federal government.
In this vein, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) explicitly
stated that these relations are exhaustively regulated by the Constitution and that
general international law cannot even be applied analogously or subsidiarily in this
respect.53
The question, however, whether and to what extent general international law is
applicable within domestic law and between federal entities, is largely determined by
historical facts.54 Heinrich Triepel aptly acknowledged this circumstance when he
argued that the existence and continuing validity of international legal elements were
more likely in States originating in federations of former sovereign States, formerly
interacting under international law, than in those States which only became
federations after the collapse of a unitary State. The decisive element is that, in the
former case, the federation only came into existence through express acts of sovereign
States, which decided to relinquish their sovereignty, either partly or entirely, and to
subject themselves to a newly formed supreme entity. In this case, it only makes sense
that these States ‘bring along’ elements of international law into the new federation
53 Cf. Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), BVerfGE 1, 14, 133; BVerfGE 34,
216, 53.
54 Albert Bleckmann, Grundgesetz und Völkerrecht (1975), 339.
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in order to keep the loss of sovereignty to the minimum – which is necessary to
become part of the newly formed federation.55
The European Union, of course, is neither a State nor a federal State. It rather is a
federal union,56 for the want of a better term, since all Member States still have the
option to withdraw from the Union according to international law57 and Article 50
TEU, respectively. But be that as it may, the overall structure of the EU comes very
close to Triepel’s example of a federal union of sovereign States in which general
international law still plays a role. This is evidenced by the fact that the CJEU widely
uses customary international law as providing rules of interpretation,58 most
importantly to construe treaties with third countries to which the Union is a party,59
and secondary EU law giving effect to such treaties.60 The Court has, however, not
even once applied the VCLT in its manifestation as customary international law61
when interpreting the EU Treaties themselves.62 Besides its interpretative function,
the Court also uses general international law in a gap-filling role to close lacunae in
specific Union law areas, for instance regarding the registration of seafaring vessels,63
55 Heinrich Triepel, Völkerrecht und Landesrecht (1899), 174.
56 Kalypso Nicolaïdis, “We, the Peoples of Europe …”, Foreign Affairs 83 (2004), 97, 102 and 105.
57 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Federalism and Jurisdiction, in: Elke Cloots/Geert de Baere/Stefan Sottiaux
(eds.), Federalism in the European Union (2012), 45, 46.
58 Cf., e.g., Kuijper (note 8), 92–93; Wouters/van Eeckhoutte (note 28), 191–194.
59 Cf., e.g., the case law on the use of Art. 31 (1) VCLT in ECJ, Case C-312/91, Procedural Issue
Relating to a Seizure of Goods Belonging to Metalsa Srl., 1993 ECR I-3751, para. 12; ECJ, Case C-
416/96, Nour Eddline El-Yassini v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 1999 ECR I-1209, para.
47; ECJ, Case C-268/99, Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2001 ECR
I-8615, para. 35.
60 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-61/94, Commission v. Germany (International Dairy Arrangement), 1996
ECR I-3989, para. 52; ECJ, Poulsen (note 23), paras. 9 and 11.
61 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2008), 121.
62 Cf. CFI, Joined Cases T-27/03, T-46/03, T-58/03, T-79/03, T-80/03, T-97/03, and T-98/03,
SP SpA and Others v. Commission, 2007 ECR II-1357, para. 58: “The reference to international law, and
in particular to Articles 54 and 70 of the Vienna Convention, fails to have regard to the sui generis
nature of the Community legal order […]. The indivisibility of the Community legal order and the lex
specialis to lex generalis relationship between the ECSC and EC Treaties mean that the consequences of
the expiry of the ECSC Treaty are not governed by the rules of international law but must be assessed
in the light of the provisions existing within the Community legal order”.
63 ECJ, Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd. and
Others, 1991 ECR I-3905, para. 17.
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the conditions for granting nationality,64 or whether work carried out on the
Netherlands section of the continental shelf can be regarded as having been carried
out within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands proper.65 In all these cases, the CJEU
found that it fell to the Member States to regulate these areas, albeit with due regard
to Union law, in accordance with the rules of general international law.
It thus becomes evident that EU law does not exhaustively govern the relations
between the Member States inter se and between the Member States and the EU.
Beyond the scope of application of the Treaties, those relations certainly continue to
be subject to the rules of general international law, as the example of the Jurisdictional
Immunities case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) clearly illustrates:
When Germany brought a case against Italy for failing to respect its jurisdictional
immunity as a sovereign State, Germany asserted in its application that, although the
present case involves two EU Member States, the CJEU has no jurisdiction to
entertain it, since the dispute is not governed by any of the jurisdictional clauses in
the Treaties. Moreover, “[o]utside the specific framework […] the [Member States]
continue to live with one another under the régime of general international law.”66
Obviously, the ICJ did not engage in this matter, as the final judgment does not show
any references to the CJEU or its potential jurisdiction in this case.67
Yet, it remains questionable and controversial whether and to what extent
customary international law can be used within the scope of application of the
Treaties where those Treaties remain silent. The next sections will therefore examine
whether EU law could indeed be supplemented by general international law or
whether the latter may even be used as a subsidiary normative layer in intra-Union
relations and thus set aside the more specific rules of Union law.
64 ECJ, Case C-369/90, Mario Vicente Micheletti and Others v. Delegación del Gobierno en
Cantabria, 1992 ECR I-4239, para. 10.
65 ECJ, Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services Ltd., 2002 ECR I-2013, paras.
31–34.
66 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Application by
G e r m a n y  o f  2 3  D e c e m b e r  2 0 0 8 ,  p a r a .  6 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :  h t t p : / / w w w . i c j -
cij.org/docket/files/143/14923.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2015).
67 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece Intervening), Judgment of
3 February 2012, ICJ Reports 2012, 99.
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B. Subsequent Member State Practice
We should bear in mind that the legal basis of the European Union’s legal order
are treaties, not a ‘genuine’ domestic constitutional document, whose relationship
with general international law is governed by international law itself. There is no
doubt that, from a public international law point of view, all major revision treaties of
the last decades, including the Lisbon Treaty, were amendments of multilateral
treaties under the legal regime of Articles 39 to 41 VCLT. Article 39 VCLT states
that a treaty may be amended by an agreement between all the parties, to which the
international rules on the conclusion of treaties apply. And since the international
regime of treaty amendment is informed by utmost flexibility, this default rule is of
residual nature68 and can therefore be easily set aside by the parties when concluding
the original treaty in the way they wish.69 Article 48 TEU on the revision procedure
of the Union Treaties is living proof of that.
Yet, this also entails that the founding treaties remain subject to derogation by
subsequent practice, according to international law70 and within the meaning of
Article 31 (3)(b) VCLT. Since the words of the treaty in question are given a (more)
precise meaning by deeds of the treaty parties,71 subsequent practice “constitutes
objective evidence of the understanding of the parties as to the meaning of the
treaty.”72 Most importantly, the rules of treaty interpretation in the context of
subsequent practice are also applicable to the constituent instruments of
international organisations, by virtue of Article 5 VCLT, which has also been
confirmed by the ICJ in its opinion on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conflict.73 It therefore seems plausible that the EU Member States
68 Jutta Brunnée, Treaty Amendments, in: Duncan B. Hollis (ed.), The Oxford Guide to Treaties
(2012), 347, 350.
69 Bruno de Witte, Treaty Revision Procedures after Lisbon, in: Andrea Biondi/Piet
Eeckhout/Stefanie Ripley (eds.), EU Law after Lisbon (2012), 107, 108.
70 Gianelli (note 5), 96.
71 Gardiner (note 61), 225.
72 ICJ, Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 December 1999, ICJ Reports
1999, 1045, para. 49.
73 ICJ, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion of
8 July 1996, ICJ Reports 1996, 66, para. 19.
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could, in fulfilling their obligations under the Union Treaties,74 alter the meaning of
EU primary law via subsequent practice.
The Luxembourg Court, however, cannot accept this view. It objected to the
concept of derogation from the Treaties by subsequent Member State practice, and
ruled that the Treaties “can only be modified by means of the amendment procedure
carried out in accordance with Article [48 TEU].”75 Consequently, “a mere practice
[…] cannot derogate from rules laid down in the treaty. Such a practice cannot
therefore create a precedent binding on [Union] institutions with regard to the
correct legal basis.”76 Given that the European Union “constitutes a new legal order
of international law,”77 every Member State act or practice in disregard of EU law
would contribute to the disintegration of the Union system.78 Consequently, the
CJEU shortly thereafter not only dropped the reference to “international law” in
Costa v. E.N.E.L.79 and thereby further substantiated the Union’s legal autonomy
towards general international law, but also confirmed that “a mere practice cannot
override the provisions of the Treaty.”80 This may be true from the perspective of EU
law. Under international law, however, the question nonetheless remains whether the
Member States still have the legal power to jointly act in non-compliance with Article
48 TEU in order to derogate from the Treaties. To put it bluntly, we should ask
whether the Member States – in a twist of bitter irony – may place themselves outside
the boundaries of EU law in order to change the EU legal order from the ‘outside.’81
The fact that EU primary law rests on international agreements concluded
between the Member States speaks in favour of this view, in particular given the
74 Oliver Dörr, Article 31, in: Oliver Dörr/Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds.), Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties: A Commentary (2012), para. 80.
75 ECJ, Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, 1976
ECR 455, para. 58.
76 ECJ, Case 68/86, United Kingdom v. Council, 1988 ECR 855, para. 24.
77 ECJ, Case 26/62, van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, 1963 ECR 1,
10.
78 ECJ, Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 ECR 585.
79 Ibid., 593.
80 ECJ, Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, 1994 ECR I-3641, para. 36.
81 Hans-Joachim Cremer, Art. 48 EUV, in: Christian Calliess/Matthias Ruffert (eds.), EUV/AEUV-
Kommentar (2011), para. 20.
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Member States’ option to act on the basis of an actus contrarius or actus modificens to
the Treaties,82 and thus to disintegrate the Union at their discretion. Beyond that, the
EU is not a sovereign subject of international law, which exists independently from
the will of the Member States, or which has acquired international sovereignty from
them. As a consequence, we might – provocatively – conclude that the EU merely
exists since the Member States permit it to exist.83 The Member States retained an
untouched core of independence84 and thus never surrendered their legal power to
conjointly undo the European project.85 This view is also in line with the general
consent rule of Article 54 (b) VCLT which states that “[t]he termination of a treaty
[…] may take place […] at any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with
the other contracting States” (emphasis added). Since this provision displays the
contracting parties’ joint right and power under general international law to dispose
of any treaties at their will, they may not only terminate the first treaty by concluding
another treaty, but also by contravening subsequent practice governed by general
international law.86 However, one might object to this view that States parties to an
agreement could agree that their relationship shall not be governed by international
law and thence be removed from the scope of the international law of treaties
(according to Article 2 (1)(a) VCLT), for example when forming a new and
indissoluble federal State.87 The European Union could provide such an example, as
the process of European integration is purported to be irreversible.88
82 Rupert Scholz, Europäische Union und deutscher Bundesstaat, Neue Zeitschrift für
Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 12 (1993), 817, 818; Karl Doehring, Staat und Verfassung in einem
zusammenwachsenden Europa, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 26 (1993), 98, 99.
83 Trevor C. Hartley, International Law and the Law of the European Union – A Reassessment,
British Yearbook of International Law 22 (2001), 1, 8.
84 Ulrich Everling, Reflections on the Structure of the European Union, Common Market Law
Review 29 (1992), 1053, 1076.
85 Jochen Frowein, Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit,
Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 54 (1994), 1, 10; Rudolf
Bernhardt, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht und das Recht internationaler Organisationen:
Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede, in: Gerhard Hafner et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum: Professor Ignaz
Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th Birthday (1998), 25, 33–34.
86 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2007), 254.
87 Thomas Giegerich, Article 54, in: Dörr/Schmalenbach (eds.) (note 74), para. 48.
88 Peter Herzog, Article 240 TEC, in: Hans Smit/Peter Herzog (eds.), The Law of the European
Union, Vol. 6 (2008), 240.03–240.04.
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Nonetheless, as mentioned before, it remains undisputed that the Union’s legal
basis is founded on international treaties and that the EU is not a federal State which
means that the Member States could in fact supersede the EU Treaties’ legal effects
via contravening subsequent practice. Of course Union law tries to bar the Member
States from changing EU primary law by legal avenues other than those governed in
Article 48 TEU.89 Subsequent practice cannot play an important role in the various
means of interpretation employed by the CJEU90 simply because it is the Treaties
that shall govern the practice of the Member States, and not vice versa.91 Any
subsequent practice in contravention of Article 48 TEU certainly constitutes a
watering down of the EU legal order and is therefore regarded as a threat to the
uniformity and autonomy of Union law.92
Moreover, the Member States apparently prefer the explicit rules of EU law on
treaty revision over those of international law: The ‘Euro crisis’ has shown that the
Member States are careful to follow EU law when amending the Treaties (in this case,
Article 136 (3) TFEU which allows for the establishment of a financial stability
mechanism),93 even if recourse to general international law would have been possible.
Lastly, one has to wonder why, if the Member States actually disagreed with the
CJEU’s findings that Article 48 TEU constituted the sole way to amend the Treaties,
they would not have used the repeated occasions of Treaty revision to “set the record
straight” in a way they intended.94 It can therefore be concluded that with regard to
subsequent State practice, recourse to international law and subsequent
destabilisation of Union law is practically irrelevant. Theoretically, however, it is still
89 Cremer (note 81), para. 21.
90 Georg Nolte, Jurisprudence under Special Regimes Relating to Subsequent Agreements and
Subsequent Practice: Second Report for the ILC Study Group on Treaties over Time, in: Georg Nolte
(ed.), Treaties and Subsequent Practice (2013), 210, 301.
91 Gordon Slynn, The Use of Subsequent Practice as an Aid to Interpretation by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities, in: Roland Bieber/Georg Ress (eds.), Die Dynamik des Europäischen
Gemeinschaftsrechts (1987), 137, 138.
92 Nial Fennelly, Legal Interpretation at the European Court of Justice, Fordham International Law
Journal 20 (1996), 656, 672.
93 European Council, Decision of 25 March 2011 Amending Article 136 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose
Currency is the Euro (2011/199/EU), OJ 2011 L 91, 1.
94 J. H. H. Weiler, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass,
Harvard International Law Journal 37 (1996), 411, 433.
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within the Member States’ power to rely on general international law in order to act
in violation of these rules. This could supposedly be one of the reasons why the
drafters of the EU Treaties did not include any reference to the function of general
international law within the Union’s legal order. This conclusion remains, however,
hypothetical and therefore ultimately unprovable.
C. ‘Self-Contained Regimes’ and Countermeasures
Another reason for the absence of an explicit reference to the functions of
customary international law within EU law could be the deliberate derogation from
custom by creating a new organisation, namely the Union, on the basis of
international agreements. Article 3 (5) TEU certainly commits the EU to respect
international law in its relations with non-Member States, as well as other subjects of
international law, but it does not oblige the Union to apply general international law
in its internal dealings with the Member States. In other words, precisely because
primary law is treaty law, it may well derogate from general international law in the
relations among Member States inter se and between the EU and the Member
States.95
In this regard, former ICJ Judge Bruno Simma raised the question whether
European Union law, as a ‘subsystem’ of public international law,96 and its remedies
in the form of obligatory judicial dispute settlement procedures with binding
decisions, definitely excludes international measures of self-help, such as
countermeasures, between Member States inter se and between Member States and
the Union, or whether there is the chance of an exceptional ‘fall-back’ on general
international law. He also asked to which extent EU law can be considered ‘self-
contained’ in the meaning that the Union alone can claim the right to react to
violations of EU law and thus bar aggrieved Member States from hearkening back to
the general norms of internationally wrongful acts. Lastly, Simma also wonders
whether the principle of residual application of general international law to
international organisations as enshrined in Article 5 VCLT is thus also valid for State
95 Gianelli (note 5), 96.
96 Axel Marschik, Subsysteme im Völkerrecht: Ist die Europäische Union ein „Self-Contained
Regime“? (1997), 193 et seq.
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responsibility.97 In other words, one could equally enquire whether the autonomous
EU system either provides for an exhaustive list of remedies which does not permit
any subsidiary recourse to general international law; or whether Union law, as a quasi-
‘ancillary’ legal order of public international law allows for the application of
countermeasures under the general rules of State responsibility98 by Member States
against other Member States when breaching EU law.99
At the outset, it should be analysed whether the European Union’s legal order is in
fact a ‘self-contained regime’ which only allows for the application of an exhaustive
and definite list of secondary rules, and thus excludes the fall-back to the general rules
of internationally wrongful acts.100 Without doubt, EU law contains primary rules,
governing the rights and duties of the Union, the Member States and individuals
within the scope of EU law, and certain secondary rules, which guarantee the
enforcement of primary rules. If the EU is an ‘open subsystem’ of international law,
general secondary rules may well be applied in order to enforce EU primary rules; if
the EU, on the other hand, is a ‘closed subsystem,’ Union law is entirely uncoupled
from general international law and thus its set of secondary rules101 may well foresee
its possible abuse by Member States and hence “specif[y] the means at the disposal of
the […] State[s] to counter any such abuse.”102 Suitable candidates for an EU set of
secondary rules are (1) proceedings before the Luxembourg Court, in concreto
infringement proceedings under Article 258 TFEU and Article 259 TFEU; (2)
secondary legislation redressing breaches of Union law; (3) the direct effect of EU law
before domestic courts; and (4) the proceedings under Article 7 TEU to act if a
Member State violates the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, i.e. human dignity,
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.103 In
97 Bruno Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 16 (1985),
111, 123.
98 Cf. Arts. 49 et seq. ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
GAOR, 56th Sess., Suppl. 10, 43 et seq.
99 Frank Schorkopf, Die Maßnahmen der XIV EU-Mitgliedstaaten gegen Österreich: Möglichkeiten
und Grenzen einer „streitbaren Demokratie“ auf europäischer Ebene (2002), 69.
100 Simma (note 97), 117.
101 Schorkopf (note 99), 70.
102 ICJ, Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of
America v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, ICJ Reports 1980, 3, para. 86.
103 Simma (note 97), 125.
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particular (1) and (4), proceedings before the CJEU and proceedings under Article 7
TEU, respectively, merit special consideration and will therefore be discussed in the
following paragraphs. The instrument of State liability as developed by the CJEU in
cases such as Francovich104 and Brasserie du Pêcheur105 will not be examined at this
point, since it does not represent a comprehensive dispute settlement procedure
under EU law of its own. In fact, if a Member State refused to provide a remedy as
required by Francovich, the EU or the other Member States would then bring an
action for failure to act (under Article 258 or 259 TFEU) or instigate proceedings
under Article 7 TEU in order to redress this issue.106
1. Infringement Proceedings
The first aspect to be explored is infringement proceedings as a very effective and
sophisticated set of secondary rules. The CJEU had to deal with the relationship
between the internal enforcement of EU law and general international law for the
first time when Luxembourg and Belgium pleaded that the international rules of
State responsibility allowed a Member State, when aggrieved by the failure of another
Member State to perform its obligations, to withhold performance of its own. The
defendant States argued that, in such a case, the Commission would lose its right to
instigate infringement proceedings before the Court.107 The CJEU decided, however,
that EU primary law is not merely
limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and legal persons to
whom it is applicable, but establishes a new legal order which governs the powers, rights
and obligations of the said persons, as well as the necessary procedures for taking
cognizance of and penalizing any breach of it. Therefore, except where otherwise expressly
provided, the basic concept of the Treaty requires that the Member States shall not take the
104 ECJ, Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci v. Italy, 1991
ECR I-5357.
105 ECJ, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. Federal Republic of Germany
and The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd. and Others, 1996 ECR I-
1029.
106 Gerard Conway, Breaches of EC Law and the International Responsibility of Member States,
European Journal of International Law (EJIL) 13 (2002), 679, 688–689.
107 ECJ, Joined Cases 90/63 and 91/63, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 1964 ECR 625,
631.
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law into their own hands. Therefore the fact that the Council failed to carry out its
obligations cannot relieve the defendants from carrying out theirs.108
The CJEU continued to emphasise the departure which infringement proceedings
represented from the traditional dispute settlement mechanisms of international
law109 and held that the advantages the Member States took from being part of the
Union also imposed on them the obligation to respect its rules,110 which also includes
the EU’s compulsory rules on dispute settlement. Moreover, the Court confirmed
this approach in the Mutton and Lamb case and ruled that the Member States are
prohibited from unilaterally adopting corrective measures on their own authority to
prevent any failure by other Member States to comply with EU law.111 This means, in
a nutshell, that Member States affected by an alleged breach of Union law by another
Member State must submit their case to the Luxembourg Court in accordance with
Article 259 TFEU, and that they must not resort to the unilateral application of
countermeasures under international law.
This approach conforms to the rule set forth in Article 344 TFEU and thus the
Member States’ obligation not to submit disputes regarding the interpretation or
application of EU law to any court other than the CJEU.112 Both with regard to
unilateral actions under general international law and to judicial dispute settlement,
the Luxembourg Court claims absolute and exclusive jurisdiction in order to
maintain the autonomy of EU law.113
In this light, it was a prudent manoeuvre of Hungary to submit a bilateral dispute
with Slovakia to the Luxembourg Court before hearkening back to unilateral
measures under international law. Although the CJEU eventually ruled that
Slovakia’s refusal to allow the Hungarian President access to Slovakian territory was
not in violation of Union law (as the Member States’ right to control the access of a
108 Ibid. (emphasis added).
109 Anthony Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (2nd ed. 2006), 44.
110 ECJ, Case 39/72, Commission v. Italy (Premiums for Slaughtering Cows), 1973 ECR 101, para.
24.
111 ECJ, Case 232/78, Commission v. France (Mutton and Lamb), 1979 ECR 2729, para. 9.
112 Cf. in this respect the seminal judgment ECJ, Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (Mox
Plant), 2006 ECR I-4635.
113 Cf. also Paul Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on
Human Rights (2013), 19–49.
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foreign head of State to their territory is governed by customary international law and
international conventions, and not the principle of free movement under Article 21
TFEU),114 any myopic unilateral measure on the part of Hungary, without prior
clarification by the Luxembourg Court, could have violated the aforementioned
principle of exclusive jurisdiction of Article 344 TFEU. Such a move could have
resulted in infringement proceedings by the Commission under Article 258 TFEU.115
General Advocate Yves Bot also noted that any dispute on the interpretation and
application of Union citizenship and free movement rights should be dealt with by
the Luxembourg Court “by means of one of the procedures provided for in [the
Treaties], in this case Article 259 TFEU.”116
Should the CJEU in the end decide that a Member State is in fact responsible for
a violation of Union law, the convicted Member State must certainly comply with the
judgment. In the event of non-compliance, the Commission may bring the case
before the Court, which may impose a lump-sum or penalty payment on the
defaulting Member State if it has in fact not complied with the previous judgment
(Article 260 (2) TFEU).117 The mechanism under Article 260 (2) TFEU thus plainly
constitutes “the sharp end of the overall enforcement procedure […].”118
Yet, the EU Treaties remain silent on the question which legal consequences
another act of non-compliance – this time the second judgment, confirming the
breach of EU law by not complying with the first judgment – would entail. Certain
international lawyers argue that measures of reprisal or an exceptio non adimpleti
contractus within the meaning of Article 60 VCLT would not be admissible in order
to react to a violation of Union law by a Member State;119 others, however, assume
114 ECJ, Case C-364/10, Hungary v. Slovakia, paras. 34 and 52, available via:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-364/10 (accessed on 3 March 2015).
115 Ibid., para. 23.
116 ECJ, Case C-364/10, Hungary v. Slovakia, Opinion of Advocate General (AG) Bot, para. 47,
a v a i l a b l e  a t :
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=120050&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=EN&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=273405 (accessed o 11 March 2015).
117 ECJ, Case C-387/97, Commission v. Greece (Failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations),
2000 ECR I-5047.
118 Paul Craig/Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (2011), 438.
119 Conway (note 106), 693; Simma (note 97), 126; Jürgen Schwarze, Das allgemeine Völkerrecht in
den innergemeinschaftlichen Rechtsbeziehungen, Europarecht (EuR) 18 (1983), 1 et seq.; Ulrich
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that the application of measures under international law to enforce European Union
law are permissible, but only after the local remedies of the ‘subsystem’ EU have been
exhausted120 or if the EU judicial system has proved entirely ineffective in a given
situation.121 Such measures therefore represent the last resort to guarantee the
effectiveness of Union law, which must certainly comply with the strict rules of State
responsibility, i.e. reprisals (or countermeasures, to use the modern term) must be
applied proportionally and short of the use of force.122 Beyond that, the general rules
on State responsibility are hence merely residually applicable.123 The case of Hungary
v. Slovakia proves that if there is a dispute between Member States concerning the
interpretation of EU law, the CJEU claims full jurisdiction, even if, at the end of the
day, the substantive scope of the dispute lies outside Union law.124 And although the
Kadi cases did not involve questions of State responsibility or a dispute between
Member States, the Luxembourg Court clearly conveyed to Member States such as
the United Kingdom (which would have preferred to see the EU act in question on
combating terrorism125 not being invalidated)126 that if international law is not
Everling, Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Verträge? Zum
Verhältnis von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht und Völkerrecht, in: Rudolf Bernhardt et al. (eds.),
Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung, Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit, Menschenrechte: Festschrift für
Hermann Mosler (1983), 173, 173 et seq.
120 Michael Smith, The European Union and International Order: European and Global
Dimensions, European Foreign Affairs Review 12 (2007), 437, 440; Albert Bleckmann, Die Rechtsnatur
des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts: zur Anwendbarkeit des Völkerrechts im Europäischen
Rechtsraum, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung (DÖV) 31 (1978), 391, 393–394; Hubertus A. H. Audretsch,
Supervision in European Community Law: Observance by the Member States of their Treaty
Obligations (1986), 138–146; Torsten Stein, Die regionale Durchsetzung völkerrechtlicher
Verpflichtungen: Europa, ZaöRV 47 (1987), 95, 108.
121 Bruno de Witte, European Union Law: How Autonomous is its Legal Order?, Zeitschrift für
Öffentliches Recht (ZÖR) 65 (2010), 141, 152.
122 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, 392, para. 249, and Art. 50 (1)(a) Articles on
the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.
123 Bruno Simma/Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self-contained Regimes in
International Law, EJIL 17 (2006), 483, 516.
124 Which, of course, raises the question why the Court did not find the case inadmissible at the
outset, if the position of heads of States is regulated by international law, and Slovakia did not apply EU
law; cf. Tamas Vince Ádány, International Law at the European Court of Justice: A Self-Contained
Regime or an Escher Triangle, Hungarian Yearbook of International Law 1 (2013), 165, 179.
125 Council Regulation (EC) No. 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, imposing certain specific restrictive
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida
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capable of protecting individual rights in the way Union law is, the former has to give
way to the latter. In the light of these findings, concerns about a potential
‘barbarisation’ of the relations between the EU Member States through a potential
fall-back to the rules of general international law seem unjustified.127
2. Serious Breaches of Fundamental Values and Article 7 TEU Proceedings
The second aspect to be discussed at this point are proceedings under Article 7
TEU, which allow, after consultations, hearings, and the submission of observations,
for the suspension of voting rights of a Member State in the Council, if the Member
State in question allegedly acts in contravention of the values referred to in Article 2
TEU.128 Proceedings under Article 7 TEU bear closer resemblance to classical dispute
settlement procedures under public international law, which are also used by other
international organisations129 to respond to grave violations of values shared among
the members of these organisations.130 The question remains, however, whether
Article 7 TEU contains exhaustive provisions on dispute settlement, which thence
enjoins the Union and the Member States from hearkening back to the general rules
of international law, or whether such a fall-back may be admissible in case the
relevant provisions of EU law fail to bring about a viable solution.131
The first potential evidence hinting at the exclusiveness of Article 7 TEU is the
comprehensive modification to the said provision brought about by the Nice
network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 467/2001 of 29 May 2002
prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and
extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, OJ
2002 L 139, 9.
126 Appeal brought on 16 December 2010 by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland against the judgment of the General Court (Seventh Chamber) delivered on 30 September 2010
in Case T-85/09, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission (Case C-595/10 P), OJ 2011 C 72, 10.
127 Marschik (note 96), 289, para. 86.
128 These values are the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.
129 Cf., e.g., Art. 6 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNCIO 15, 335; Art. 8 Statute of
the Council of Europe, 5 May 1949, ETS No. 001; or Art. 30 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11
July 2000, UNTS 2158, 3.
130 Matthias Ruffert, Art. 7 EUV, in: Calliess/Ruffert (eds.) (note 81), para. 1.
131 Schorkopf (note 99), 68–69.
26 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 @ 2014
Treaty132 which renders it more precise than in the Treaty of Amsterdam,133 its
predecessor.134 The Lisbon Treaty all the more enshrines Article 7 TEU in Part I of
the Treaty on European Union and therewith as a ‘constitutional core provision’ of
EU law.135 Proponents of the exclusive character of Article 7 TEU additionally argue
that the bilateral countermeasures of the (at that time) fourteen other EU Member
States against Austria in 2000136 on the basis of general international law,137 i.e. the
refusal to meet with the Austrian delegates on a bilateral basis and to deny them
access to EU meetings in order to protest against the admission of a right-wing party
into a coalition government, were clearly in violation of Union law and thus
impermissible.138 This deliberate circumvention of the relevant provisions of EU law
was therefore also in contravention of the general principles of law, as enshrined in
Article 38 (1)(c) Statute of the International Court of Justice139.140 Beyond that,
European Union law clearly lacks any interconnection between the breach of Union
values by one Member State and bilateral sanctions by the other, non-defaulting,
Member States. This approach also underlines the Union’s role in providing
assistance to maintain democratic institutions or fundamental rights through
132 Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Union and Certain Related Acts, 26 February 2001, OJ 2001 C 80, 1.
133 Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, 2 October 1997, OJ 1997 C 340, 1.
134 Gráinne de Búrca, The Evolution of EU Human Rights Law, in: Paul Craig/Gráinne de Búrca
(eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (2nd ed. 2011), 465, 484.
135 Ruffert (note 130), para. 31.
136 See Statement from the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union on Behalf of XIV
M e m b e r  S t a t e s ,  3 1  J a n u a r y  2 0 0 0 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :
http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/fileDownload.do;jsessionid=Ng8KStTVk5CvsXhnJGcm4q8Rry89P6cT8
bs35h08fhpvFPssDYGc!1615003456?docId=84237&cardId=84237 (accessed on 15 January 2015).
137 Katrin Träbert, Sanktionen der Europäischen Union gegen ihre Mitgliedstaaten: Die
Sanktionsverfahren nach Art. 228 Abs. 2 EGV und Art. 7 EUV (2010), 226.
138 Michael Merlingen/Cas Mudde/Ulrich Sedelmeier, The Right and the Righteous? European
Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions Against Austria, Journal of Common Market Studies 39
(2001), 59, 66–67; Andrew Williams, The Indifferent Gesture: Article 7 TEU, the Fundamental Rights
Agency and the UK’s Invasion of Iraq, European Law Review 31 (2006), 3, 7–10 and 25; and Wojciech
Sadurski, Adding Bite to a Bark: The Story of Article 7, E.U. Enlargement, and Jörg Haider, Columbia
Journal of European Law 16 (2010), 385, 385.
139 Statute of the International Court of Justice, 26 June 1945, UNCIO 15, 355.
140 Ludwig Adamovich, Juristische Aspekte der „Sanktionen“ der EU-14 und des „Weisenberichtes“,
Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 28 (2001), 89, 90.
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recommendations under Article 7 TEU if such fundamental values are threatened
within a State.141 As a consequence, if there is no breach of these values, there is also
no basis for sanctions under general international law.142
Another argument for the exclusiveness of Article 7 TEU proceedings states that
the Member States do not have the competence to enact countermeasures inter se for
serious violations of human rights and the rule of law, since the concrete course of
action for doing so is already governed by EU law. Consequently, minor breaches not
amounting to the threshold of severity under Article 7 TEU must also be dealt with
by the instruments provided for by the Treaties, such as the aforementioned
infringement proceedings under Articles 258 or 259 TFEU, whereas unilateral
reprisals are thus considered impermissible.143
The view contrary to the exclusiveness theory holds that Article 7 TEU does not
exclusively govern the law of sanctions between EU Member States, as this provision
does not invest the Union with the exclusive competence to sanction Member States
acting in violation of the EU’s fundamental values. Such exclusivity would
furthermore not only entail the complete and utter loss of this competence on part of
the Member States, but it would also prove to be practically futile, as the Union is
entitled to act under Article 7 TEU even in those cases in which a Member State has
violated the Union’s values outside the scope of EU law.144 In other words, a Member
State may also breach these values and the EU’s principle of homogeneity by acting
without any relation to Union law whatsoever, since the values of Article 2 TEU
represent a fundamental European catalogue of common and shared values among
the Member States.145 Furthermore, it is also manifest that the European Union does
141 De Búrca (note 134) 470.
142 Heribert Franz Köck/Margit Hintersteininger, Zu den Sanktionen der vierzehn EU-
Partnerstaaten gegen Österreich, in: Erhard Busek/Martin Schauer (eds.), Eine europäische Erregung:
Die „Sanktionen“ der Vierzehn gegen Österreich im Jahr 2000 (2003), 317, 342–343; Heribert Franz
Köck, Die Maßnahmen der EU-14 gegen Österreich, in: Konrad Ginther et al. (eds.), Völker- und
Europarecht: 25. Österreichischer Völkerrechtstag (2001), 109, 115–116.
143 Schorkopf (note 99), 72.
144 Stefanie Schmahl, Die Reaktionen auf den Einzug der Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs in das
österreichische Regierungskabinett: Eine europa- und völkerrechtliche Analyse, EuR 35 (2000), 819,
832–833.
145 Ibid., 821, and Frank Schorkopf, Homogenität in der Europäischen Union: Ausgestaltung und
Gewährleistung durch Art. 6 Abs. 1 und Art. 7 EUV (2000), 69.
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not have any competence to govern the relations between the Member States inter se,
as it is the Member States’ sovereign right to determine the scope of bilateral relations
with their European neighbours. Although Article 7 TEU contains an exhaustive list
of sanctions, there is no evidence that the Member States have in fact lost the
competence to enact sanctions against each other.146 The Member States of the
European Union could, for instance, impose unilateral countermeasures against each
other in case they violated a fundamental principle not mentioned in Article 2 TEU,
or if the breach does not reach the minimum level of severity as required by Article 7
TEU.147 It is also evident that the EU does not have exclusive competence for
imposing preliminary measures below the threshold of Article 7 TEU, since there is
no legal basis for such competence in the Treaties, nor did the Council pass any
respective legislation based on Article 7 TEU. Yet, as the former alternative would
require Treaty amendments and the latter option would fail due to the lack of the
Council’s power to legislate on the basis of Article 7 TEU, the Member States may
impose such sanctions as preliminary measures against each other according to the
rules of general international law.148
Since the ‘nuclear option’149 of Article 7 TEU has never been applied in practice,150
there is no telling whether these proceedings are sufficient to react to serious breaches
of EU values, or whether the Union and the other Member States cannot help but
falling back to the general rules of international law to properly react in emergency
situations. In a nutshell, however, it can be seen that mere political disagreements do
146 Christian Busse, Österreich contra Europäische Union: Eine rechtliche Beurteilung der
Reaktionen der EU und ihrer Mitgliedstaaten auf die Regierungsbeteiligung der FPÖ in Österreich
(2000), 21–22 and 27–28.
147 Franz Leidenmühler, Zur Legalität der Maßnahmen gegen die österreichische Bundesregierung
– Rechtsfragen aus Anlass der internationalen Reaktionen auf die Regierungsbildung eines
Mitgliedstaates der EU, ZÖR 55 (2000), 299, 312.
148 Waldemar Hummer/Walter Obwexer, Die Wahrung der „Verfassungsgrundsätze“ der EU –
Rechtsfragen der „EU-Sanktionen“ gegen Österreich, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 11
(2000), 485, 489.
149 Cf., e.g., Lauri Bode-Kirchhoff, Why the Road from Luxembourg to Strasbourg Leads through
Venice: The Venice Commission as a Link between the EU and the ECHR, in: Kanstantsin
Dzehtsiarou et al. (eds.), Human Rights Law in Europe: The Influence, Overlaps and Contradictions of
the EU and the ECHR (2014), 55, 68.
150 Williams (note 138), 27, who argues that the use of Art. 7 proceedings “[…] would be
catastrophic. Even its possible application would set in train disastrous events that might undo the very
fabric of the Union”.
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not constitute serious breaches of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and
therefore cannot result in proceedings under Article 7 TEU. This provision can
consequently be considered an exhaustive list of measures which may be applied to
bring defaulting Member States back in line with the principles of European Union
law. This means that the EU Member States asserted rights which do not exist under
EU law when they imposed bilateral sanctions against Austria in 2000 and therefore
potentially violated the Union’s legal order themselves.151 Today the majority view is
that these sanctions, especially the refusal to grant the Austrian delegates access to EU
consultations, were illegal and impermissible under EU law152 (yet certainly legal
under international law),153 and, if such a case were to occur again under the current
legal conditions, proceedings under Article 7 TEU would have to be pursued in any
event.
One could consequently assume that nowadays, after the CJEU has extensively
corroborated its exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as Mox Plant,154 the Member
States would thus be obliged to await the results of Article 7 TEU procedures and
then – in case they should fail – call upon the Luxembourg Court to settle such
disputes before resorting to bilateral countermeasures. Even though the Court may
rule that the principles violated by the Member State in question are not within the
ambit of EU law, as it recently did in the Hungary v. Slovakia case,155 Article 344
TFEU nevertheless commits the Member States not to submit disputes to any other
court or tribunal than the Union courts. The only exception remain cases where there
is absolutely no doubt that the dispute in question does not even remotely touch
upon Union law, as for instance in the Jurisdictional Immunities case.156 Finally, the
increasingly negative fundamental rights situation in Hungary since 2011
151 Bruno de Witte/Gabriel N. Toggenburg, Human Rights and Membership of the European Union,
in: Steve Peers/Angela Ward (eds.), The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: Politics, Law, and Policy
(2004), 59, 77.
152 Adamovich (note 140), 90; Ruffert (note 130), para. 33; Sadurski (note 138), 401–405; Schorkopf
(note 99), 68 et seq.
153 Matthew Happold, Fourteen against One: The EU Member States’ Response to Freedom Party
Participation in the Austrian Government, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (2000),
953, 962.
154 ECJ, Mox Plant (note 112).
155 Id., Hungary v. Slovakia (note 114), paras. 34 and 52.
156 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (note 67).
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demonstrates that general international law is not even considered to bolster the
possibility of unilateral or stronger methods of Treaty enforcement. In fact,
infringement proceedings instigated by the Commission against Hungary,157 and the
European Parliament’s “Tavares Report”158 emphasise that the EU institutions and
the Member States try to use all the methods provided for in the Treaties to pressure
Hungary into conforming with EU fundamental rights. In conclusion, recourse to
general international law in order to bring defaulting Member States ‘back in line’
with Union law hence also seems to be a mere hypothetical possibility without any
real chance of transpiring.
3. Expulsion of EU Member States
The question remains what the Member States should do with another Member
State which continues to breach the principles of Union law, even after they have –
unsuccessfully – initiated proceedings under Article 7 TEU as well as infringement
proceedings under Article 259 TFEU (or Article 258 TFEU if they have asked the
Commission to intervene). Despite the Euro crisis and some populist calls for the
expulsion of deeply indebted Member States such as Greece from the Union, the
actual expulsion of a Member State certainly appears to be a merely hypothetical
question which will most likely not transpire in reality. We should nevertheless carry
this thought a little further, just out of academic curiosity and for the sake of
argumentative completeness.
If the Member States ponder over the step of expulsing a defaulting Member State,
it is clear that they must first ‘exhaust the domestic remedies’ of EU law, i.e. the
abovementioned proceedings (Article 7 TEU and/or infringement proceedings).159
Since there is no explicit provision in the Treaties allowing for the expulsion of
157 Cf., e.g., ECJ, Case C-288/12, Commission v. Hungary (Data Protection), Judgment of 8 April
2014, not yet reported, OJ 2014 C 175, 6.
158 European Parliament, Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices
in Hungary (pursuant to the European Parliament Resolution of 16 February 2012)
( 2 0 1 2 / 2 1 3 0 / ( I N I ) ) ,  2 4  J u n e  2 0 1 3 ,  A 7 - 0 2 2 9 / 2 0 1 3 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t :
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A7-2013-
0229+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (accessed on 15 January 2015).
159 Oliver Dörr, Art. 50 EUV, in: Eberhard Grabitz/Meinhard Hilf/Martin Nettesheim (eds.), Das
Recht der Europäischen Union: EUV/AEUV (2014), para. 46.
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Member States,160 the Member States may then fall back on the general rules of
international law161 as a sort of remedium ultimum,162 after the procedural steps of EU
law have failed. This assumption in turn raises the question on which concrete
international norms the Member States could rely to expel a ‘pariah’ among them. At
the outset, the remaining Member States need to pursue this course of action
unanimously,163 before they may hearken back to the relevant provisions of the
VCLT – albeit only in analogous fashion via its concurrent existence as customary
international law, as Article 4 VCLT does not allow for the retroactive application of
the Convention,164 and the EU Member States France and Romania have, so far,
decided not to ratify it.
Since Article 5 VCLT (or rather its counterpart in customary international law)165
allows for the application of the Convention to the constituent treaties of an
international organisation and therewith to the EU Treaties, a potential candidate
norm for the expulsion of a Member State could be Article 60 (2)(a) VCLT,166 which
is considered a codification of customary international law.167 Should a contracting
party be in material breach of a multilateral treaty, Article 60 (2)(a) VCLT allows for
the suspension of this treaty between the defaulting contracting State and the other
parties. Sceptics may argue, however, that this provision is not applicable, as Article
60 (4) VCLT establishes the rules of Article 60 VCLT as residuary norms vis-à-vis
any leges speciales of the treaty applicable in the event of a breach. Proceedings under
160 Cf. for an extensive analysis on the lack of such a provision Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and
Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some Reflections, European Central Bank Legal Working Paper
Series, No. 10 (2009), 1, 32–36.
161 Ruffert (note 130), para. 31.
162 Friedemann Götting, Die Beendigung der Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union (2000), 151,
para. 9.
163 Henri de Waele, The European Union on the Road to a New Legal Order – The Changing
Legality of Member State Withdrawal, Tilburg Foreign Law Review 12 (2004), 169, 185.
164 Schmahl (note 144), 829. Given that the VCLT entered into force in 1980, it would thus
retroactively apply to those Member States who have joined the EU prior to this date.
165 Aust (note 86), 394.
166 Schmahl (note 144), 829; Simma (note 97), 128; and Manfred Zuleeg, Der Bestand der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Roland Bieber/Albert Bleckmann/Francesco Capotorti (eds.), Das
Europa der zweiten Generation: Gedächtnisschrift für Christoph Sasse, Vol. 1 (1981), 55, 62–63.
167 ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ
Reports 1997, 7, para. 46.
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Article 7 TEU possibly constitute special proceedings under Article 60 (4) VCLT
and would therefore bar the application of Article 60 (2)(a) VCLT and the general
rules of international law.168
Yet, international lawyers counter this argument by referring to the wording of
Article 7 (3) TEU which only allows for the suspension of certain rights “deriving
from the application of the Treaties to the Member State in question, including the
voting rights of the representative of the government of that Member State in the
Council” (emphasis added). This means that, firstly, only certain rights of a
defaulting Member State can be suspended, but not the membership itself, and
secondly, that Article 7 TEU does not contain an exhaustive list of any contrivable
sanction against defaulting Member States in the event of serious breaches.169 We
might therefore conclude that Article 7 TEU is not a lex specialis within the meaning
of Article 60 (4) VCLT and does therefore not foreclose the use and application of
the general rules of international law (for instance the customary rules of Article 60
(2)(a) VCLT) in order to expel Member States for serious breaches of European
Union law. But again, from the perspective of political reality, the expulsion of an EU
Member State is a mere academic thought experiment which is very unlikely to occur
in practice.
IV. Conclusion: “Si Tacuisses …”?
It seems appropriate to conclude this contribution with a proverb. The approach
which the drafters of the Lisbon Treaty obviously followed when formulating the
new provisions in both Article 3 (5) TEU and Article 21 TEU, appears to mirror
Boethius’ advice “Si tacuisses, philosophus mansisses.”170 Although these two provisions
clearly express the Union’s commitment to upholding international law vis-à-vis the
outside world and insinuate an innovative and courageous acceptance of public
168 Thomas Giegerich, Article 60, in: Dörr/Schmalenbach (eds.) (note 74), para. 70.
169 Schmahl (note 144), 830.
170 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy (reprint, 2008), 36: “‘So now at last do you realize that
I am a philosopher?’ Whereupon the first man bitingly answered: ‘I should have known it, if you had
kept your mouth shut’”.
           GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION          33
international law in the EU legal order,171 they fall short of being proper
incorporation clauses, which can usually be found in State constitutions. It seems that
this silence is not due to a limited relevance or to the lack of interest by the European
Union in the international legal system. It rather appears that the drafters of the EU
Treaties were aware of the effect the explicit recognition of the relation between
general international norms and the Treaties might have on the very fabric of the EU
system, as this recognition could erode the Treaties’ character as founding
‘constitutional’ instruments and therewith threaten the Union’s establishment as a
quasi-domestic legal order, which is intended to remain distinct from the rules of
international law.172
This certainly leaves a bitter taste in the mouths of legal theorists who are hence
prevented from finding clear and unambiguous models of classifying the EU’s
relationship with international law. A straightforward provision on how general
international law is to be implemented within Union law would unquestionably be
helpful in order to overcome the current confused practice of the Court which
appears to be oscillating between monism and dualism.173 In practice and aside from
any speculations, however, the CJEU has in fact accepted that the general rules of
international law are binding on the Union and that they form part of the EU legal
order, which means that these rules are nowadays incorporated on a traceable case-by-
case basis, and not in their entirety as the whole set of customary international law.
The judgment in Racke, which serves as a judicial substitution of such an
incorporation clause, proves that a codified incorporation clause is not absolutely
necessary in order to give effect to general international law in a ‘domestic’ setting.
Yet, with respect to the normative hierarchy of EU law and the way the CJEU has
decided certain landmark cases (in particular the Kadi saga), it may, nonetheless, have
been a wise choice to follow Boethius’ saying and to keep quiet on this matter and not
to include a provision on the status of general international law within the EU’s legal
order, as this might have further complicated matters and bereft the Court of its
flexibility, especially when it comes to the protection of fundamental rights.
171 Theodore Konstadinides, When in Europe: Customary International Law and EU Competence
in the Sphere of External Action, German Law Journal 13 (2012), 1177, 1180.
172 Gianelli (note 5), 97.
173 Beatrice I. Bonafé, International Law in Domestic and Supranational Settings (2014), 378, 389.
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With respect to the functions of general international law in EU law, the
European Union’s legal order represents – to a certain extent – a self-contained
regime under international law, whose Member States are free to rely on the rules of
general international law in their dealings with each other outside the ambit and scope
of European Union law, as the Hungary v. Slovakia case174 demonstrated. It is,
however, impermissible for them to initially resort back to these rules when EU law
is involved in a dispute. In this case the Member States are required to first exhaust
the ‘domestic’ remedies of the Treaties before they may impose sanctions under
international law against one another.
This theoretically means that the Member States may fall back to the general rules
of the international legal system after all remedies provided for by Union law have
been exhausted without any positive results. In other words, not even the highly
specialised and integrated EU system has completely been ‘decoupled’ from the leges
generales of international law.175 Metaphorically speaking, the law of the European
Union may have left the uterus of its ‘maternal’ legal order, i.e. public international
law, but it seems that the umbilical cord has not been entirely cut. Simma concludes
that the profound opposition of EU lawyers against the residual application of
international law appears predominantly to be based on the fear that “the more
highly integrated [EU] legal order could otherwise be ‘infected’ by the more
‘primitive’ international law processes of auto-determination and self-help.”176
Of course, on the other hand, one could also raise the question whether there still
is, in practice, a need for the residual application of international norms when rules
and remedies under EU law are both comprehensive and in fact very effective.177 If
the need for Treaty amendments arises, the Member States rather meticulously
follow the procedures set out by the EU Treaties. And even if certain Member States,
for political or fiscal reasons, refuse to integrate instruments such as the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the Fiscal Compact in primary Union law,178 and
174 ECJ, Hungary v. Slovakia (note 114).
175 Simma (note 97), 128–129.
176 Ibid., 127.
177 Simma/Pulkowski (note 123), 516–517.
178 European Council, Statement by the Euro Heads of State or Government, 9 December 2011, 7,
available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126658.pdf
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prefer to conclude international agreements to achieve this end, this does not subvert
the EU legal order. On the contrary, as the CJEU confirmed in the Pringle case,
Article 273 TFEU in conjunction with Article 373 (3) ESM Treaty179 entrusts the
Court with the jurisdiction to interpret and apply the provisions of this very treaty in
a binding manner.180 Therefore it can always counteract any subsequent Member
State practice potentially in contravention to the EU Treaties in this context.
Moreover, the Union’s legal order provides for highly sophisticated and elaborate
enforcement mechanisms which, in principle, do not require the application of the
more general norms of international law. Particularly the two instruments of
infringement proceedings and proceedings under Article 7 TEU constitute the
Union’s backbone to ‘seal off’ EU law as a regional subsystem of the international
legal order and therewith to eliminate any reason to hearken back to the general rules
of public international law.181 Practically, this finding entails that the silence of the
Treaties appears to be irrelevant in this respect, because not even the drafters’
‘negligence’ in this regard proved an effective means to cut the ties between European
Union and public international law. Yet, at the end of the day, there is the –
admittedly unlikely – possibility that the European Union’s enforcement
mechanisms fail and that the more general toolbox of customary international law
needs to be re-opened once again. In extremis, recourse to these rules cannot be
absolutely excluded.182
This means, in conclusion, that even though the silence of the Treaties on the
functions of general international law within Union law does not make a difference
with respect to a potential recourse to the subsidiary international rules and thus the
autonomy of EU law, it can be hypothesised that a provision on the implementation
of general international law could have a certain impact on the Court’s flexibility
when dealing with international norms. Thus, the Union may not have exactly
(accessed on 15 January 2015).
179 Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, 2 February 2012, available via:
http://esm.europa.eu/ (accessed on 15 January 2015).
180 ECJ, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Ireland, paras. 170–177, available via:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-370/12 (accessed on 3 March 2015).
181 Conway (note 106), 688.
182 Ibid., 682–683.
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remained a philosopher in the meaning of Boethius’ words, but at the very least a
functioning supranational organisation sui generis.
